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Abstract
In this paper we present a multi-modal security-transportation model to allo-
cate security resources within a chemical supply chain which is characterized
by the use of different transport modes, each having their own security fea-
tures. We consider security-related risks so as to take measures against terrorist
acts which could target critical transportation systems. The idea of addressing
security-related issues, by supporting decisions for preventing or mitigating in-
tentional acts on transportation infrastructure, has gained attention in academic
research only recently. The decision model presented in this paper is based on
game theory and it can be employed to organize intelligence capabilities aimed
at securing chemical supply chains. It enables detection and warning against
impending attacks on transportation infrastructures and the subsequent adop-
tion of security countermeasures. This is of extreme importance for preventing
terrorist attacks and for avoiding (possibly huge) human and economic losses.
In our work we also provide data sources and numerical simulations by applying
the proposed model to a illustrative multi-modal chemical supply chain.
Keywords: Multi-modal transportation, Security, Risk analysis,
Game-theory, Multi-attribute utility
1. Introduction
In Europe and in the United States, huge amounts of hazardous materials
(hazmat) are continuously transported. Daily shipments of dangerous goods
are in fact critical to the economies of Europe, U.S., and the rest of the world.
However, these transportation activities involve various types of security risks.
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In case of (even minor) incidents, dangerous freights would strongly attract the
attention of the general public, policy makers and industrialists. It is thus es-
sential, as much for the responsible government as for the private authorities,
to efficiently secure these hazardous transports. Take the complex chemical
supply chain as an example, we could consider it as a single, complete system
starting from the raw materials supplier, through the manufacturing and distri-
bution process, to the final end-use customer, and any residuals management,
including the transportation network in between [1]. Since a lot of stakehold-
ers are involved, it is not easy to adequately and efficiently secure a chemical
transportation supply chain. Moreover, it should be noted that the threats
of intentional attacks on the chemical supply chain substantially differs from
the one of unintentional incidents. While the unintentional accident likelihood
depends on (relatively) well-known parameters such as maintenance of infras-
tructure, speed characteristics and the presence of junctions, the intentional
accident likelihood relates to much less known factors such as vulnerabilities,
consequences, and intentions.
One of the key factors of the chemical supply chain is multi modality; i.e., the
use of different transport modes, each having their own characteristics with re-
spect to economic and environmental parameters, as well as characterized with
safety and security mode-specific features (see e.g. [2]). Multi-modal trans-
portation is very much prevalent in the chemical industry, using road, railway,
barges, ships, and pipelines to transport goods. The majority of transporta-
tion firms are specialized in one single transportation mode; they rarely operate
combining several modi on their own. For example a shipper company that
is specialized in maritime transportation, has to rely on a different carrier to
transport, by ground vehicles, a product to a final customer. Nonetheless, by
transporting chemical products employing different modes, (e.g. moving goods
from road onto rail, ship or pipeline or vice versa, for security considerations),
the chemical industry and its logistic service providers could greatly improve
their security scores.
Hence, the security resource allocation problem exists on both intra- and
inter-modal levels. On an intra-modal dimension, the authorities or the com-
panies responsible for the transport have to decide on which transportation
routes (belonging to the same mode, that is road, rail-road, inland waterways
or pipeline) available between point A and point B (A and B being e.g. a com-
pany, a city, or a storage park) security measures have to be taken. This decision
regarding security resources allocations should take into account all critical uni-
modal transportation routes between A and B and it should be repeated for
every dangerous freight the authorities or the companies wish to investigate.
On an inter-modal dimension, the different available modi for transporting a
certain hazardous cargo between A and B should be investigated and security
resources need to be allocated between the different modi, which forms an extra
complexity to the uni-modal security resources allocation problem. Actually,
multi-modal planning is more difficult than uni-modal planning, both on an
operational (i.e., planning of individual shipments), and on a tactical/strategic
level (i.e., planning of flows of goods through the network). Therefore, an even
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stronger need for support by a transportation security risk model is present in
the multi-modal case.
Three research lines are present in scientific literature regarding the devel-
opment of safety decision support software for transports of dangerous freights:
(i) safety-related risk assessment software packages [3–9]; (ii) route selection
and vehicle scheduling software packages [10–14]; and (iii) hazardous materials
network design software [15–19]. Note that these software packages dealing
with safety-related transport problems are designed to guide uni-modal deci-
sions. Among these useful models there are probabilistic tools, GIS-based tools,
tools ensuring an equitable distribution of risk, tools based on the iterative
application of minimum path algorithms, tools based on the generation of min-
imum paths, tools based on multi-objective algorithms, bi-levels programming
tools (taking into account two distinct decision-makers: the government and
transport companies), and tools based on heuristic algorithms.
However, the idea of developing such software packages addressing security-
related issues and specifically aiming them at supporting decisions for preventing
or mitigating intentional designed malicious acts on transportation infrastruc-
ture, has only very recently gained attention in the academic world. We are
aware that various conceptualisations and software packages (GIS-based or not)
for dangerous freight risk assessments capturing one or several of the transport
modes, have been elaborated and are explained in literature. However, these
software applications are aimed at safety related (non-intentional) risks and they
could not be used for taking measures against intentional (terrorist) acts. In
fact, to our knowledge, at present there is no model of dangerous substances
transportation available to governmental or industrial decision makers build-
ing on multi-attribute utility functions and providing recommendations about
where to optimally allocate security measures and resources in a multi-modal
chemical transportation network (e.g. in the United States or in Europe). This
paper elaborates such a model using game theory.
2. Game theory used in security problems
Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, game theory has been
increasingly employed as a mathematical tool to deal with security decisions
facing with adaptive adversaries. In particular, recent literature includes [20–25]
and [26]. The reader is referred to [27] and [28] for an extensive survey. More
specifically, gaining insights into the nature of optimal defensive investments
yielding the best trade-off between investment costs and critical infrastructure
security was also already subject of an important amount of scientific research
(see e.g. [29–41]).
However, to date, no concrete attention has been paid to the multi-modal
transportation security resources allocation decision problem. This is thus a
research subject deserving much more attention from the academia. In fact,
the cost on the entire supply chain of a weapon of mass destruction shipped via
containers is estimated to be $1 trillion, whereas the September 11 attacks on
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the two World Trade Center buildings only costed some $83 billion direct and
indirect costs [42].
Organizing intelligence capabilities to detect and to warn of impending at-
tacks on transportation infrastructure and subsequently allocating and taking
security countermeasures is thus one of extreme importance for preventing ter-
rorist attacks and for avoiding huge human and economic losses.
We agree with Cox [43] that game theory and risk analysis are mutually
reinforcing in order to obtain effective risk management recommendations for
allocating security resources. In case of our multi-modal transportation prob-
lem, we choose to focus on the development of an attacker-defender model based
on game theory. We consider a dynamic game with incomplete information in
which the defender chooses how to allocate the security resources (e.g. on which
transport routes, on which modes), and then an attacker chooses which target
to attack (e.g. which route, which mode) according to a multi-attribute util-
ity function. A model focusing on multi-modal transportations of hazardous
substances should make the decision process of taking security countermeasures
allocations in a complex transportation network more objective and (subse-
quently) more justified. The internal parameters of the model can be tuned
by the decision maker in a really easy way in order to cope with realistic and
customized scenarios.
In the remainder of the paper we will refer to a strategic game as a model in
which a set of decision makers interact with each others. In recognition of the
interaction, we will use the term players to identify the decision makers.
The aims of this paper are to (i) include a ranking of transportation routes
and modes where to allocate security countermeasures based on certain assump-
tions; and (ii) provide this ranking considering both inter- and intra-modal
transports of hazardous goods.The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 3 sets up a one-period multi-modal security-transportation model.
Section 4 provides data sources and numerical simulation. Section 5 elabo-
rates on the description of the solution approach. Experimental tests are also
presented. Section 6 concludes this paper and provides some future research
directions.
3. A multi-modal security-transportation model
In this paragraph we describe a MultI-modal Security-TRAnsportation
modeL, that we named MIST RAL for short, that can be concretely adopted
to increase the security of chemical transportation networks. Supply chains
used to transport hazardous materials represent a viable target for terrorist
groups mainly due to the following factors:
• the physical and chemical properties of the transported material may cause
a malicious release which could potentially engender public injuries to a
neighbouring population and/or environmental damages;
• the critical importance of the products may determine the disruption of
operations of the whole industry along the supply chain.
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In general terrorists pick up their targets (e.g. critical infrastructures) for
strategic reasons in order to maximize the direct and indirect consequences of
the attack [44]. The transported material and its operating conditions (e.g.
pressure, temperature, density, volume) are both crucial to determine the criti-
cality of the supply chain. In fact the possible scenarios (e.g. explosions, toxic
cloud migrations, thermal radiation effects, toxic releases), that can arise after
an attack, influence the level of criticality of a certain supply chain. For this rea-
son, by including other transportation modes which are commonly adopted to
transport non-hazardous materials, the MIST RAL model could be generalized
to other supply chains that might be a potential target for terrorists-attackers.
In our study, we focus on four real and tangible transportation modes which
are commonly encountered within chemical supply chain: inland waterways
(i = 1), road transport (i = 2), railway (i = 3), and pipeline (i = 4). As
mentioned before, it should be noted that by enlarging the set of available
transportation modes the MIST RAL model could be generalized and extended
to other supply chains which are used for non chemical products.
We consider there are ri routes for each mode i. Therefore, there are alto-
gether r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 routes in the system. For route j in mode i, we let the
government’s defence level be dij and let the terrorist’s attack level be Aij , for
i = 1, . . . , 4 and j = 1, . . . , ri. The attack (defence) level quantifies the amount
of attack (defence) resources such as materials, human resources, technologies,
equipment, instrument, expertise, industrial capability and capacity employed
by an attacker (defender) to perform a specific action. The probability of dam-
age conditional on an attack happening on each route is a function of dij and
Aij . In particular, we apply the common ratio form contest success function
[45], that is:
Pij(Aij , dij) =
Aij
Aij + βi · dij (1)
where βi is the relative defence/attack effectiveness ratio for mode i. We as-
sume that β1 > β2 > β3 > β4 (i.e., the inland waterways transports are easiest
to defend while pipeline transports are most difficult to defend). It should be
noted that the values of βi can be set by the decision maker depending on the
specific characteristics of transportation modes i which characterize the sup-
ply chain that is considered. The choice made in this paper does not affect
the applicability of the model to other supply chain systems where the pecu-
liarities of the transportation modes require a different relationship between
the defence/attack effectiveness ratios. Note that we have ∂Pij/∂dij ≤ 0 and
∂Pij/∂Aij ≥ 0. We define Pij(0, dij) = 0 ∀ dij .
In real-life transportation networks, transport modes may present a different
topology, with parallel and serial structures, as shown in Figure 1. In this paper,
we assume that road (i = 2) and pipeline (i = 4) have a parallel structure, while
5
inland waterways (i = 1) and railway (i = 3) have a serial structure1.
Assuming performance independence among routes j = 1, . . . , ri within a
mode i, the vulnerability of mode i, Qi is calculated as:
Qi(Ai, di) =

ri∏
j=1
Pij(Aij , dij), if i = 2, 4 for parallel structures
1−
ri∏
j=1
[1− Pij(Aij , dij)], if i = 1, 3 for serial structures
(2)
where Ai = (Ai1, . . . , Airi) and di = (di1, . . . , diri). Referring to the valua-
tion of route i, we named vi the conditional expected loss due to a successful
attack. We consider two types of losses (direct and indirect) financial loss fi
and human loss hi) and use the following multi-attribute utility function:
vi = fi + c · hi (3)
Direct financial losses represents the material damages to e.g. infrastruc-
tures, equipments, installations directly induced by an attack, while the indirect
financial losses are related to the indirect consequences of the terrorist actions.
These latter include also the psychological effects of the attacks on people. In
principle also the fear engendered by the terrorists as a direct consequences of
an attack may have an impact on a nation’s economy and may be quantified in
different ways. In particular, the financial impacts on both the transportation
and tourism sectors can be estimated as well as it would be possible to quantify
the losses in the financial markets and the reduction of foreign direct invest-
ment in a country. For more details about how to quantify the consequences of
a terrorist attack the reader is referred to[47–49].
In Formula (3) c represents a factor translating human loss into financial
terms. Furthermore, we assume that f2 < f4 < f1 < f3 and h1 < h4 < h2 < h3;
in other words, road transportation and inland waterways would lead to the
lowest possible financial and human losses respectively, and railway would lead
to the highest financial and human losses. These are just some assumptions
that we made without loss of generality which can be easily changed by the user
of the MIST RAL model to fulfil the requirements of a specific chemical supply
chain.
We assume that the government desires to maximize the total expected
averted losses, subtracting the total defence costs, while the terrorist wants to
maximize the total expected damage, subtracting the total attack costs. In other
words, government and terrorist maximize their utilities u(A, d) and U(A, d)
respectively as follows:
1We acknowledge that this assumption on system structure depends on the scope of the
security study, but we believe generally these assumptions are reasonable [46].
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max
d
u(A, d) =
4∑
i=1
{vi · [1−Qi(Ai, di)]− b ·
ni∑
j=1
dij} (4)
max
A
U(A, d) =
4∑
i=1
[vi ·Qi(Ai, di)−B ·
ni∑
j=1
Aij ] (5)
In Formulae (4)-(5) b and B are the costs of resources unit associated to
the adoption of a specific defence of attack strategy respectively. To mention
some examples, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a
Pentagon organization, estimates the costs of resources unit employed by ter-
rorists to carry on a specific terrorist action. In particular a cost of $400 is
estimated for an attack made by using a remote-controlled bomb, $1,200 for a
suicide bombing vest, while the cost for a suicide car bomb can vary between
$13,000 and $20,000 depending on the car that is employed. A = (A1 . . . , A4)
and d = (d1, . . . , d4) represent a specific set of possible actions to be adopted
by the attacker and the government respectively. In particular these actions
are addressed to a specific transportation mode (e.g. Ai = (Ai1, . . . , Airi) or
di = (di1, . . . , diri)) each containing j routes. In the remainder of the paper we
will refer to A and d with the term strategies to denote a specific attack (for A)
and defence (for d) actions. The quality of each strategy is measured by using
the utility functions, mentioned before, which are able to capture and quantify
the players’ preferences. The main assumptions employed inside the MIST RAL
model are summarized in Table I.
It should be noted that in the strategic game the players’ payoffs have only
a ordinal significance. For example, if a player has three available (attack or
defence) strategies named a, b, and c for which the resulting payoff is respectively
1, 2, and 10, the only conclusion that it is possible to draw is that the player
prefers c to b and b to a. In other words the values associated to the payoff in
themselves do not imply that the player’s preference between c and b is stronger
than his preference between a and b [50].
Below we consider two possible sequences of move: simultaneous-move and
sequential move (where the defender is the first mover). Both sequences have
been studied in literature [51–53]. If the defence is public information and ter-
rorists know the defence allocation before making the attacking decisions, a
sequential-move model should be used. Otherwise, if both players make deci-
sions at the same time, or at least they do not know the other player’s choice at
the time that they make their own decisions, a simultaneous-move model should
be used.
Definition 1. We call a pair (A∗, d∗) an equilibrium for a simultaneous-move
MIST RAL game if and only if A∗ = arg max
A
U(A, d∗) and d∗ = arg max
d
u(A∗, d).
Definition 2. We call a pair (A∗, d∗) an equilibrium for a sequential-move
MIST RAL game (where the government is the first mover) if and only if
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A∗ = Aˆ∗ and d∗ = arg max
d
u(Aˆ∗, d), where Aˆ∗ = arg max
A
U(A, d) is the
best response function.
4. Data sources and numerical examples
In order to test the MIST RAL model described before, we present an illus-
trative system of a chemical supply chain which is represented in Figure 2. In
our simplified, but realistic, transportation system we considered three different
transportation modes: inland waterways (i = 1), road transport (i = 2) and
railway (i = 3). Additionally, we suppose that 2 routes are available for trans-
portation mode i = 2. Therefore there are 4 routes in the system. These routes
can be combined together to generate two alternative paths to reach the desti-
nation node D starting from the origin node O passing through the intermediate
nodes m and n. The first path is made by the following transportation modes:
inland waterway, road 1 and train. The second path is composed by inland wa-
terway, road 2 and train. In this way it is possible to model a realistic chemical
supply chain in which hazmat materials are transported from a production site
O to an harbour m by a container ship through an inland waterway, then from
the harbour the chemical products are transported by trucks to the closer rail
loading station m from which the goods are transported by train directly to the
warehouse of raw materials of a chemical company in D.
We suppose that β1 = 75%, β2 = 60% and β3 = 45%. The value of c is
set equal to 200 (reasonable values of c used to transform a human loss into
economic values are in the range 1− 10× 106e). Without loss of generality, we
suppose that the unit costs for defence are ten times higher than the unit costs
for attacks (b = 10·B). This assumption reflects realistic situations in which the
government investments in defence strategies are much higher than attackers’
investments for terrorist attacks. Therefore in our numerical example we set
b = 100 and B = 10. The values associated to fi and hi for each transportation
mode i are summarized in Table II.
In our example we suppose that the government’s defence level dij can have
a 3-point scale: 1, 2 or 3 (low, medium, or high), depending of the level of
investments to secure and to protect route j contained in transportation mode
i. The same values can be used to measure the attack levels Aij for all routes
j in transportation mode i. This assumption is rather plausible, in fact in the
United States a scale based on colors is used to measure the terrorist threats
[54]. This scale, also known under the name of “terror alert level”, is based on
a scale of 5 colors (green, blue, yellow, orange, red) measuring an increasing
risk of terrorist attacks (low, general, significant, high, severe). Each level (e.g.
red code for severe risk of terrorist attacks) triggers specific actions by the
government affecting thus the security level of public facilities. In other words
the government adapts its defensive strategies to the possible terrorist threats.
A similar scale is currently adopted in Europe in particular in the UK to give to
the government a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Five
different threat levels (low, moderate, substantial, severe and critical) are based
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on the assessment of a range of factors including current intelligence, recent
events and what is known about terrorist intentions and capabilities. Moreover
these levels inform decisions about the levels of security needed to protect critical
national infrastructures [55].
5. Solution approach
In principle, in a MIST RAL game, the players’ interests are diametrically
opposed. The aim of the attacker is to destroy the chemical supply chain while
the government is committed to secure it. Moreover if the attacker adopts
a successful attack, which determines high financial and human damages, the
consequences of the attack are paid by the government whose objective is to
secure a given infrastructure, by investing in its protection.
Strategic situations which involve players with completely opposite interests
are known in literature as strictly competitive games. A two players strictly
competitive game is a two players game in which for every two strategies s and
sˆ the following property holds, where u1 and u2 represent the utility for player
1 and 2 respectively:
u1(s) > u1(sˆ) and u2(s) < u2(sˆ) (6)
A player’s gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the losses (or gains) of
the utility of the other player(s) [56]. In other words if a player is increasing his
payoff by applying a specific strategy, the same strategy will lead to a reduction
in the other players payoff. An interesting class of strictly competitive games
is represented by the “zero-sum games” in which the payoffs of the players add
up to zero. In a 2 players zero-sum game the following equation is valid:
u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2) = 0 ∀ (s1, s2) (7)
In other words the payoff that is gained by the first player is exactly the lost
in the payoff of the second player [57]. This class of games can be solved by
using the Nash equilibrium concept which can be obtained by solving a linear
programming problem. In general, assuming that each player (government of
attacker) chooses his (defence or attack) strategy according to a rational choice
model, given his belief about the other players’ strategy and supposing that ev-
ery player’s belief about the other players’ actions is correct, a Nash equilibrium
can be defined as follows:
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy s∗ with the property that no
player i can do better by choosing a strategy different from s∗i , given that every
other player j adheres to s∗j [58].
An alternative concept is based on the so called Min-Max theorem which is
closely related to linear programming duality [59]. The Min-Max theorem [60]
states that in zero-sum games, there always exists a solution of the game.
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As emphasized in all the game theory books zero-sum games are easier to
be solved than the non zero-sum games and for a 2-players non-repeated zero-
sum game, the different solution approaches (Nash equilibrium or the Min-Max
theorem) all generate the same solution [57].
In our MIST RAL game, depending on the parameters used inside the model
(that are b, B, hi, fi, Aij , dij , βi, vi) the resulting utilities for the attacker
and the defender might lead to a non zero-sum game. In order to simplify the
solution of the MIST RAL game is thus preferable to transform the game into a
zero-sum game (see Section 5.1) and then a solution can be obtained by applying
the steps depicted in the solution approach which is shown in Figure 3. The final
step of the solution approach is referred to as the outcome of the game which is
found in compliance with the Definition 1, for a simultaneous-move MIST RAL
game, and with the Definition 2, for a sequential-moveMIST RAL game. Several
applications of the aforementioned solution approach are reported in Sections
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
5.1. Transformation into a zero-sum game
In this section the process to transform a non-zero sum MIST RAL game
into a zero sum game is explained by means of a practical example. Suppose
that four possible defence strategies (denoted by letters d1, d2, d3 and d4) can
be adopted by the government. In addition the same four identical strategies
(i.e. having the same level of intensity dij = Aij ∀ i, j) are also available for
the attacker (denoted by letters A1, A2, A3 and A4). Both attack and defence
strategies at the inter-modal and intra-modal dimension are represented in Table
III.
Based on these attack and defence strategies a MIST RAL game is played
once in a simultaneous manner. Combining together the aforementioned attack
and defence strategies and by using theMIST RAL parameters defined in Section
4 (that are, b, B, hi, fi, βi, vi), it is possible to compute the government’s and
the attacker’s payoffs. Since the game is not played sequentially, the payoffs
associated to each couple of attacker’s and defender’s strategies are summarized
in a normal form by using a payoff matrix as a convenient representation of
the MIST RAL game. In Table IV four rows correspond to the four possible
strategies of the government, the four columns correspond to the four possible
strategies of the attacker. The numbers in each cell represent the players’ payoffs
associated to the strategies to which the cell corresponds, with the government’s
payoff listed first.
As it can be observed from the payoff matrix in Table IV the sum of the
government’s and the attacker’s payoffs is not equal to zero for all the strategies
pairs. For this reason a transformation of the MIST RAL game into a zero-sum
game is needed. The advantage of the transformation is that a zero-sum game
always presents an equilibrium.
Using a transformation described in Belavkin [61] it is possible to transform a
non zero-sum game into a zero-sum game, so that an equilibrium always exists
and its value is equal to the value of the original game. The transformation
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is equivalent to the introduction of a passive player whose pure strategy has
already been chosen and its associated payoff depends on the strategies adopted
by the active players. This transformation is justified by the law of conservation
of utility in a game.
The space of the outcomes of that game is Ω = Ω1 × · · · × Ωm, where Ωi is
the set of pure strategies of player i, and ui : Ω→ R are the utility functions of
player i. In a non zero-sum game the following property holds:
u1 + · · ·+ um 6= 0 (8)
By using the bijection T : U → U˜ where T (u) = u+u0 and u0 = − 1
m
m∑
i=1
ui
it is possible to transform the players’ utility functions in order to generate a
zero-sum game. It is easy to demonstrate that the transformed utility functions
achieve a zero-sum game:
u˜1 + · · ·+ u˜m =
m∑
i=1
(ui + u0) =
m∑
i=1
ui +m · u0 =
m∑
i=1
ui −
m∑
i=1
ui = 0 (9)
In the MIST RAL model, a possible interpretation of the passive player is
represented by society which cannot immediately decide on which security coun-
termeasure to adopt in order to protect an infrastructure, even though it suffers
the consequences of a possible attack. The payoff of the passive player is com-
puted by using the following formula:
2 · u0(A, d) = −[u(A, d) + U(A, d)] (10)
where the subscript 0 refers to the passive player, whereas u(A, d) and U(A, d)
represent the payoffs of the government and of the attacker respectively. The
new payoff matrix after the transformation of the original MIST RAL game into
a zero-sum game is represented in Table V in which the passive player and its
associate payoffs are omitted to preserve the form of the original payoff matrix.
In Figure 4(a) the original payoffs (for the non-zero MIST RAL game), asso-
ciated to each couple of attack and defence strategies, are plotted, whereas in
Figure 4(b) the new payoffs associated to the government-attacker, after having
transformed the game into a zero-sum MIST RAL game, are represented. By as-
sessing Figures 4(a) and 4(b) it can be observed that the new payoffs have been
rescaled in comparison with the original ones, but their symmetry is preserved,
respecting thus the conservation law of utility and equilibria in a non zero-sum
game.
5.2. Unlimited attacker’s and government’s strategies
In this section we assume that the attack or defence levels can assume only
three integer values within the range [1, 3] and that no constraint limits the
number of available attack and defence strategies. Under these reasonable but
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sometimes not completely realistic 2 assumptions and considering the trans-
portation system described in Figure 2, both the government and the attacker
have at their disposal a set containing 81 (34 that is 3 attack or defence levels
that can be associated to each of the 4 available routes) different (defence or at-
tack) strategies. These strategies are obtained by assigning three values for the
attack or defence levels to each transportation mode i and route j contained
in the transportation system. We assume that both the government and the
attacker can freely select their own strategy from the 81 available moves. We
conducted an experiment in two different stages. In the first phase we supposed
that the MIST RAL game is played once following a simultaneous-move. In the
second phase we assumed that the MIST RAL game is played once according to
a sequential-move game in which the government is the first mover.
In the first case, when both players play at the same time, neither the gov-
ernment nor the defender know in advance the strategy that will be selected
by the other player. Following the solution approach summarized in Figure 3
we firstly compute the government’s and the attacker’s payoffs using Formulae
(4) and (5). Then the game is transformed into a zero-sum game using the
technique explained in Section 5.1. The normal form of the MIST RAL game
is obtained by generating a payoff matrix which presents 81 rows and columns.
The strategies’ pair (A81; d81) represents the equilibrium of theMIST RAL game
respecting the conditions outlined in Definition 1.
In general in a strategic game, the best strategy for any given player depends
on the other players’ strategies. So when choosing a strategy a player must
have in mind the strategies that the other players will choose. In other words,
a player must form a belief about the other players’ strategy. In our example,
knowing that the government can adopt whatever strategy to prevent an attack,
the attacker will try to maximize his utility by setting the attack levels at
their highest values. From the opposite perspective, predicting the attacker’s
behaviour, the government will use an appropriate defence strategy in order
to secure the infrastructure which is exposed to the highest threats on all its
transportation modes. Therefore the equilibrium consists for the government in
an imitation of the attacker’s strategy, by adopting the highest levels of defence
countermeasures for both the intra-modal and inter-modal levels. This is a
rather obvious and logical result. Before elaborating on this outcome further,
the MIST RAL game has been played in a sequential-mode in the second stage
of our experiment, where the government is the first mover and then, depending
on the adopted defensive strategy, the attacker decides the type of attack to
be carried out. In this case, following the solution approach depicted in Figure
3, after having reduced the game into a zero-sum game, an extensive form of
2In fact due to a fixed budget at the government’s (attacker’s) disposal the number of
available defence (or/and attack) strategies might be limited. Moreover for technological
reasons it might be practically impossible to set a certain level of protection (or attack) for
a specific route within a given transportation mode (e.g. for a ground patrol it is practically
impossible to secure a pipeline located in a remote area without road infrastructures).
12
the game, by adopting a tree representation (as the one used in Figure 7), is
used to have a better representation of the whole game. Then the MIST RAL
game is solved using the backward induction method [57]. Also in this case,
the equilibrium is represented by the couple (A81; d81). In fact the government,
which plays first, chooses his best strategy anticipating the move of the attacker,
in order to limit his own dis-utility in case of attack. For this reason, without
any restriction posed, e.g. an existing security budget, the government sets the
defence levels at their maximum values. The attacker, which acts only after the
government’s strategy has been already adopted, chooses the attack for which
dij = 3 ∀ i, j in order to maximize his utility. Even though the government
investments in security assume the highest values for the inter-modal as well
as the intra-modal dimension, from the attacker’s perspective, strategy A81
remains the best alternative, given the current parameters of the MIST RAL
model. In case of a different attack strategy, the investments done for the
destruction of the supply chain will lead to lower attacker’s returns.
This result might be due to the parameters used inside this specific illus-
trative example. In particular when the unit cost for attack is higher and the
values associated to the losses are lower, the non-attack strategy or an attack
directed only on a single intra-modal (or inter-modal) level might be a valid
alternative to maximize the attacker’s utility.
The solution of the MIST RAL game in both cases (simultaneous-move and
sequential-move) implies for the government an imitation of the opponent’s
strategy in order to prevent the attacker’s actions and limit the consequences
of a possible attack. This result is in line with reality in which the defender
always attempts to anticipate or respond to the attacker’s actions by copying
its moves [62]. In other words, referring once again to the “terror alert level”
scale, the government adopts e.g. the maximum level of alert and the associated
security countermeasures when a severe risk of terrorist attacks is expected (red
code alarm). Therefore if the government suspects (e.g. by using the reports of
intelligence services) that an attack is possible on a specific route within a par-
ticular transportation mode, it will react with proper security countermeasures
that compensate the intensity level of the expected attack.
This also explains why authorities generally work with different defence lev-
els: it would be impossible to hold the highest alert for a long time, or it would
be unpractical to spend huge budgets to secure all routes and transportation
modes. Therefore it is more realistic and interesting to investigate the govern-
ment’s (and/or attackers’) behaviour in a MIST RAL game with restrictions as
done in the next section.
5.3. Limited attacker’s and government’s strategies
In many practical situations limited budgets are available for terrorists (or
for institutions) to attack (or to secure) chemical transportation infrastructures.
Moreover the presence of other constraints, such as the impossibility to apply
a specific attack or security measure to a particular route or transportation
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mode, due to technical aspects, might limit the usage of specific defence or
attack strategies.
As explained in the previous section, combining together three different val-
ues associated to the levels of attack or defence (Aij or dij) for each trans-
portation mode i which contains route j, it is possible to generate a set of 81
attack and defence strategies. Differently from the previous section, it might be
realistic to assume that not all these strategies are at the government’s (or the
attacker’s) disposal at the same time. Moreover, in order to simulate a realistic
scenario, without loss of generality, we assume that only four attack or defence
strategies are available for the attacker and the defender at each non-repeated
MIST RAL game.
Based on these assumptions we generated all the strategic games that can
be obtained by combining together 4 attack and 4 defence strategies per time.
In so doing we generated the following number of MIST RAL games:(
A
4
)
·
(
d
4
)
=
(
81
4
)
·
(
81
4
)
=
[
81 !
(4 !) · (81− 4) !
]2
= 2.76803× 1012 (11)
As done in the previous section, our experiments have been carried out in two
different stages: in the first phase all the resulting MIST RAL games have been
solved on the basis of the simultaneous-mode and then in the second phase of the
test the MIST RAL games have been solved according to the sequential-mode.
A computational time equals to 150 hours has been required in total for both
the phases of the experiment, using a machine with an Intel core i7-2760QM
2.40GHz processor with 4GB RAM.
In the first stage of the experiment, in 99% of the cases the MIST RAL
games present a saddle point and in 2.25% of the cases the equilibrium consists
in an imitation of the opponent’s strategy both at the inter-modal and intra-
modal dimension. This result is explicable by the fact that in many games
the government simply does not have at his disposal an appropriate defensive
strategy that can balance the attacker’s efforts. In many cases the equilibrium
of the game implies for both the government and the attacker the adoption of
the available strategies which yield the maximum relative utility.
For a better understanding, an illustrative solution, for the non-repeated
MIST RAL game played in a simultaneous-mode, is reported hereafter. The list
of the 4 defensive strategies that the government can use is reported in Figure
5, whereas the attack strategies are shown in Figure 6.
Using the available defence and attack strategies the payoff matrix is built
and the game is transformed into a zero-sum game. Therefore a new payoff
matrix is obtained (see Table VII).
The matrix in Table VII presents a saddle point and the Min-Max theorem
can be applied in order to determine the outcome of the MIST RAL game which
is (A1; d4) with an associated payoff equals to 1219 for the attacker and -1219
for the defender.
In the second phase of our experiment we supposed that a limited number
of four (attack and defence) strategies are available for each game played once
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in a sequential-move where the government is the first player.
Considering all the combinations of 2.76803 × 1012 MIST RAL games, in
2.87% of the cases the equilibrium consists for the government in an imitation
of the opponent’s strategy. Considering that the MIST RAL game is played in a
sequential manner, the imitation of the terrorist’s actions consists in anticipating
the strategy that will be adopted by the attacker. In practice the government
attempts to prevent and mitigate the consequences of an attack by adopting
appropriate security countermeasures which are addressed at counterbalancing
the level of the attacks. From the attacker’s perspective, in a sequential game
with a limited number of available strategies, an increase in the defensive in-
vestments can lead the attacker to either increase his level of efforts (to help
compensate for the reduced probability of damages after an attack), or decrease
his level of efforts (because attacking has become less profitable). In a sym-
metrical way this aspect can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of the
investments in security from intentional attacks, and can therefore affect the
relative desirability of investing to protect infrastructures.
The following example might help to understand the steps which are needed
to find the equilibrium for a sequential MIST RAL game where the government
is the first player. We suppose that the same strategies as reported in Figures 5
and 6 are used. In this case the extensive form of the game is presented in Figure
7. The government’s and the attacker’s payoffs are reported at the bottom of
the tree for each leaf node. Government’s payoffs are listed first.
Using the backward induction it is possible to find the outcome of the game.
The most credible strategies that the attackers will choose in relation to each
strategy adopted by the government at the first stage of the game are highlighted
by using dotted lines. In particular independently of the government’s strategy,
the attacker strategy A1 is the most credible. In fact, for this specific game,
A1 represents the strategy that the attacker will chose in order to maximize its
utility. That being so, the government at stage 0 will rationally select strategy
d4 in order to minimize his dis-utility and thus the consequences of the attack.
The outcome of the game, according to Definition 2 for a sequential MIST RAL
game, is therefore (A1, d4) which is highlighted with red thick lines in Figure 7.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper a model which can guarantee the security of a multi-modal
transportation system facing adaptive adversaries has been presented. The
model, named MIST RAL, can be used by public and private organizations in
order to establish the appropriate allocation of security countermeasures for
each route belonging to a specific transportation mode within a chemical sup-
ply chain.
Using theorems and concepts borrowed from game theory the MIST RAL
model can be solved by evaluating and analysing the utilities associated to the
two players with different interests that are involved in the strategic game. On
one side there is the government (or a public-private institution) who intends to
protect a given critical infrastructure by allocating adequate security measures
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on both the inter-modal and intra-modal levels, and on the other side there is
the attacker whose goal is to destroy a targeted supply chain. A methodological
scheme to reduce the game into a zero-sum game and, as a result, find the
equilibrium, has been presented and applied to a variety of illustrative examples.
Several tests have been performed considering both the cases of sequential-move
and simultaneous-move with or without unlimited (defence or attack) strategies.
When the number of defence strategies are limited and the MIST RAL game
is played simultaneously, the solution of the model consists in adopting the
available strategies which can balance the attacker’s efforts. In case of sequen-
tial game the government should adopt the available security countermeasures
aimed at minimizing the utility of the attacker. The latter, depending on the
investments in defensive measures by the government, can either increase the
attack efforts to compensate the reduced probability of damages after an attack
(whether at least one of the available attack strategies can lead to a positive
utility from the point of view of the attacker), or reduce the terror acts since no
attack strategy is profitable.
Similarly, when no limitations or constraints on the defensive or attack
strategies are applied, the solution of the MIST RAL game, in both simulta-
neous and sequential cases, consists of an imitation of the opponent’s strategy.
In other words, by using intelligence services the government should try to an-
ticipate the terrorists’ moves and guarantee appropriate security levels, which
could at least counterbalance the intensity levels of the attacks and mitigate
the consequences of an attack. This concept is applied to specific prevention
mechanisms adopted by several nations, such as those based on a “terror alert
level” scale.
This empirical result is in line with all the practical government guideline
used to react to potential terrorist attacks. For example the UK government
defines three levels of response which broadly equate to threat levels as shown
below [55]:
• Normal : routine protective security measures which are appropriate for
low and moderate related threat levels;
• Heightened : additional and sustainable protective security measures which
are recommended for substantial and severe related threat levels in com-
bination with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judge-
ments on acceptable risk, in order to reflect the broad nature of the threat;
• Exceptional : maximum protective security measures which are suggested
for critical related threats levels, in order to meet specific threats and to
minimize vulnerability and risk.
In fact the knowledge of the enemy is the basis for whichever strategic choice.
As it is asserted in the oldest book on strategy, the Art of War written by the
Chinese Sun-Tzu [63]:. . . if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need
not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the
enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle . . . .
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Possible applications of the MIST RAL model pertain to the anticipation of
potential attacks to a targeted chemical supply chain and the limitation of the
consequences of these attacks thanks to an appropriate evaluation of terrorist
threats. Additionally, the MIST RAL model can lead to a better definition and
allocation of the security countermeasures for both intra-modal and inter-modal
levels.
Future research will be aimed at extending the current MIST RAL model
to incorporate the case of repeated games. In so doing, it will be possible to
simulate realistic scenarios in which continuous attacks are directed to the same
supply chain, e.g. the repeated attacks performed on a specific critical pipeline
infrastructure [64]. Moreover, additional real-life constraints can be included in
the model such as a limited budged for security (or for the attacks), criticality of
the infrastructures constituting the whole supply chain and so forth. Additional
information about the characteristics of the transported goods can be included
in the model. As a matter of fact, the hazardousness of these materials can
influence the consequences of a potential attack.
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Figures and Tables
Route 1
...
Route ri
Route 2
(a) Parallel structure
Route 1 Route 2 ... Route ri
(b) Serial structure
Figure 1: Parallel (a) and Serial (b) transportation structures
Table I: Main assumptions in the MISTRAL model
# Assumption
1 β1 > β2 > β3 > β4
2 ∂Pij/∂dij ≤ 0, ∂Pij/∂Aij ≥ 0 and Pij(0, dij) = 0 ∀ dij
3 Parallel structure for i = 2, 4 and serial structure for i = 1, 3
4 f2 < f4 < f1 < f3 and h1 < h4 < h2 < h3
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Figure 2: Example of a transportation system for chemical materials
i fi hi
1 200 5
2 100 15
3 300 25
Table II: Values associated to financial and human losses
(a) Strategies A1
and d1
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 1 1
3 1
(b) Strategies
A2 and d2
i/j 1 2
1 2
2 2 2
3 2
(c) Strategies A3
and d3
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 2 1
3 2
(d) Strategies A4
and d4
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 2 2
3 3
Table III: List of attack and defence strategies available for the attacker and the government
respectively
A1 A2 A3 A4
d1 (2722; 6218) (1724; 7196) (1603; 7317) (1321; 7579)
d2 (3801; 4939) (2522; 6198) (2407; 6313) (1986; 6714)
d3 (3916; 4824) (2643; 6077) (2522; 6198) (2100; 6600)
d4 (4250; 4290) (2934; 5586) (2813; 5707) (2322; 6178)
Table IV: Payoff Matrix
A1 A2 A3 A4
d1 (-4470;-1748) (-4370;-569) (-4370;-454) (-4270;-20)
d2 (-4460;-2736) (-4360;-1838) (-4360;-1717) (-4260;-1326)
d3 (-4460;-2857) (-4360;-1953) (-4360;-1838) (-4260;-1447)
d4 (-4450;-3129) (-4350;-2364) (-4350;-2250) (-4250;-1928)
Table V: Payoff matrix after the transportation into a zero-sum MISTRAL game
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BEGIN
Define play-
ers’ strategies
Define payoffs
Reduce to a
sum-zero game
Sequential
game?
Define the
normal form
of the game
Saddle
point?
Solve the game
using a mixed
strategy
Define the
extensive form
of the game
Solve the game
using back-
ward induction
Find out the
equilibrium
outcome
END
no
yes yes
no
Figure 3: Flow chart used to solve the strategic MISTRAL game
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
A
1
;d
1
A
2
;d
1
A
3
;d
1
A
4
;d
1
A
1
;d
2
A
2
;d
2
A
3
;d
2
A
4
;d
2
A
1
;d
3
A
2
;d
3
A
3
;d
3
A
4
;d
3
A
1
;d
4
A
2
;d
4
A
3
;d
4
A
4
;d
4
u(A,d) U(A,d)
(a) Original payoffs
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
A
1
;d
1
A
2
;d
1
A
3
;d
1
A
4
;d
1
A
1
;d
2
A
2
;d
2
A
3
;d
2
A
4
;d
2
A
1
;d
3
A
2
;d
3
A
3
;d
3
A
4
;d
3
A
1
;d
4
A
2
;d
4
A
3
;d
4
A
4
;d
4
u(A,d) U(A,d)
(b) Transformed payoffs
Figure 4: Government’s and attacker’s payoffs before (a) and after (b) the transformation into
a zero-sum game
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(a) Attack strat-
egy A81
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 3 3
3 3
(b) defence strat-
egy d81
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 3 3
3 3
Table VI: Equilibrium of the MISTRAL game played once with a simultaneous-move
i/j 1 2
1 1
2 2 1
3 2
(a) defence
strategy d1
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 3 2
3 1
(b) defence
strategy d2
i/j 1 2
1 2
2 1 3
3 2
(c) defence
strategy d3
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 3 1
3 2
(d) defence
strategy d4
Figure 5: Available strategies for the government
i/j 1 2
1 3
2 1 2
3 3
(a) Attack strat-
egy A1
i/j 1 2
1 2
2 2 1
3 1
(b) Attack
strategy A2
i/j 1 2
1 1
2 2 1
3 3
(c) Attack
strategy A3
i/j 1 2
1 2
2 3 1
3 2
(d) Attack strat-
egy A4
Figure 6: Available strategies for the attacker
A1 A2 A3 A4
d1 (-1576;1576) (-343;343) (-1439;1439) (-1372;1372)
d2 (-1591;1591) (-582;582) (-1335;1335) (-1382;1382)
d3 (-1452;1452) (103;-103) (-974;974) (-824;824)
d4 (-1219;1219) (6;-6) (-1081;1081) (-1041;1041)
Table VII: Payoff matrix for the zero-sum MISTRAL game in a simultaneous-move. The
equilibrium of the game is reported in bold
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Government
(−1576
1576
)
A1
(−343
343
)
A2
(−1439
1439
)
A3
(1372
1372
)
A4
d1
(−1591
1591
)
A1
(−582
582
)
A2
(−1335
1335
)
A3
(−1382
1382
)
A4
d2
(−1452
1452
)
A1
( 103−103)
A2
(−974
974
)
A3
(−824
824
)
A4
d3
(−1219
1219
)
A1
( 6−6)
A2
(−1081
1081
)
A3
(−1041
1041
)
A4
d4
Attacker
Figure 7: Extensive form of the MISTRAL game
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